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Williams: Peaceful Picketing as an Exercise of Free Speech

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The danger of innocent purchasers cutting off the creditor
by a fraudulent conveyance pendente lite can be remedied by
adoption of the rule of construction laid down in the majority
of decisions under the Uniform Act. Multiplicity of suits can
be avoided, and the creditor will be given the efficient optional
remedy which the Act means to provide."
GEORGE P. SARSFIELD.
"Supra, notes 26, 27.

PEACEFUL PICKETING AS AN EXERCISE OF
FREE SPEECH
Picketing is the favorite weapon used by trade unions during their disputes with management over what shall constitute
equitable distribution of the fruits of industry. It enjoys union
favor because of its effectiveness in promoting labor's ends. Employers receiving the picketing "treatment" are not so fond of
the process however, and acting accordingly, have challenged its
legality under constitutional provisions, statutes, and the judicial
precedents. A portion of the resulting body of law is to be considered herein.
Today, the books record decisions of the highest American
court wherein peaceful picketing is designated as a form of
speech.' Therefore, an activity, formerly considered tortious by
many courts, rests comparatively secure under the guardianship
of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It will be
submitted below that Montana decisions holding picketing to be
speech have contributed to this rather spectacular change in the
legal status of the activity, and evidence supporting such assertion will be offered. Further, it will be contended that, although
the doctrine as originally announced by the U. S. Supreme Court
has been seriously limited by that body in subsequent cases, Montana law on the subject has not been generally affected thereby.
The contention that peaceful picketing is simply a form of
speech is as old as the legal history of the activity itself. In
Sherry v. Perkins,' the first peaceful picketing case,' counsel of'Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093;
American Federation of Labor v. Swing (1940) 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct.
568, 85, L.Ed. 855.
'(1888) 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307.
3Mr.
Justice Brandies credits Sherry v. Perkins with being the first
peaceful picketing case in his dissent in Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257
U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375.
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fered argument based on the idea that pickets, bearing banners
emblazoned with uncomplimentary references to plaintiff's labor
policies, were simply defaming his business, and could not be restrained from continuing to do so because of free speech guaranties. The same approach appears somewhat later in Beck v.
Railway Teamsters Protective Association' where the defending
union relied on a section of the Michigan Constitution which provides in effect that every person may freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for abuse
of such rights. It was urged by counsel for the teamsters that
publications used in connection with the picketing of plaintiff's
business were only libels, necessarily forms of speech, and thus
within the constitutional protection. Both courts, in granting
injunctions, rejected the free speech arguments and sounded the
condemnation that the writings were displayed in a manner
which intimidated the public and were therefore beyond mere
defamations of the businesses concerned.
Consideration of the free speech approach does not appear
in most of the early picketing cases, however.5 Whether counsel
for the pickets in such contests overlooked the potentialities of
the theory or simply regarded it as a hopeless one is not known.
In view of the extreme hostility of many of the courts of the era
to the whole picketing device, the latter possibility is a strong
one. That is, typical treatment of the activity was to classify it
as.a continuing tort for which there was no adequate remedy at
law, and as such it was considered fair game for the deadly injunction." In the process of reaching such a result, the usual
court utilized harshly condemning language which indicated that
any attempt to gain constitutional sanction for picketing would
have been summarily dealt with. For example, in Glass Co. v.
Bottle Blowers Assn." it was announced that "there is and can
be no such thing as peaceful picketing any more than there can
be chaste vulgarity or peaceful mobbing or lawful lynching." It
would not appear unreasonable to venture that such typical
animosity deterred lawyers of the day from pressing the free
speech argument although it might have seemed a more natural
one to them had judicial hostility been less obvious. Admittedly,'
such speculation attributes an unnatural and foolish timidity
to members of the bar, but the fact remains that the principal
element of picketing is a publication, which certainly suggests
'(1898) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13, 42 L.R.A. 407.
8
GimoORy, LABOR AND THE LAW, p. 338.
GREOORY, Op. Cit., p. 337.

7(1907) 72 N.J.Eq. 653, 66 At. 953.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol11/iss1/6

2

Williams: Peaceful Picketing as an Exercise of Free Speech

MONTANA LAW REVIEW
"freedom of speech" to anyone familiar with constitutional
law. Whatever the explanation may be, an examination of the
early cases reveals only a shadow of the concept of peaceful
picketing as speech with hints as to the eventual triumph of the
doctrine hidden among controversies as to particular factual situations and discussions of tort law thought to be applicable
thereto.
Of course, picketing was held to be a lawful activity by some
courts before the free speech argument was successfully offered.
Several comparatively early decisions concluded it to be proper
when peaceably conducted, without receiving or passing on such
contentions.' There was, however, a general unwillingness on
the part of the early courts to look upon picketing as a legitimate activity, and it is therefore stressed that genuine security
for the process came only when constitutional guardianship was
acknowledged despite later softening of the general attitude.
Without further introduction, it is proposed to trace the doctrine to its present supremacy with pertinent Montana decisions
selected for emphasis.
I.
As pointed out above, there is little to suggest the free
speech idea in most of the early picketing cases. However, the
argument was successfully used by unions in cases presenting a
highly similar situation. That is, union-sponsored circulars
were often distributed in connection with labor troubles and
resulting boycotts. These publications usually requested the
public to refrain from doing business with the boycotted employer until differences between him and the union were resolved. The appeals were often successful, and as a consequence, employers asked that distribution of the circulars be
enjoined. Some courts obliged and pronounced the activity to
be tortious as implying threats and resulting in intimidation.'
Other courts disagreed and based their disagreement on the free
speech idea. A search of the books reveals that as early as 1890
an Ohio trial court, deciding Richter Brothers v. Journeyman
'As early as 1885 it was Indicated by a Federal Court in U. S. v. Kane,
23 Fed. 748, that picketing would be proper If peacefully conducted.
For examples of early cases holding peaceful picketing proper see:
Kargas Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodmaker's Local Union 131
(1905) 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877; Rogers et al v. Evarts (1891) 17
N.Y, Sup. 264.
'State v. Glidden (1887) 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890; My Maryland Lodge
v. Adt (1905) 100 Md. 238, 59 AtI. 721; Barr v. Essex Trades Council
(1894) 53 N.J.Eq. 326, 104 AtI. 129.
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Tailor's Union,' refused to restrain the posting and circulating
of notices to the effect that plaintiff's tailoring establishment
was a scab shop which was to be shunned by all fair citizens and
that his employees were incompetent botches, professional
tramps, and ex-convicts. The court conceded the publications to
be libelous but said they could not be enjoined since they were
under a constitutional guaranty of free speech and advised the
plaintiff that his only remedy was an action for damages. It is
admitted that this case has little significance since it was decided
by a minor court with little or no influence on the more important tribunals of the day. Nevertheless, it is probably one
of the earliest examples of successful application of constitutional arguments to a labor case of the type under discussion
and deserves to be noted for that reason alone.
Probably the first important case denying equity the right
to interfere with the publication by a labor union of an appeal
to the public not to patronize the product of an unfair employer,
on the ground that to restrain such Publication would be to violate the right of free speech, was a Missouri case, Marx and H.
Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson," decided in 1902. The acts complained of were the circularizing of the public. The court in
that case relied on the section of the Missouri Constitution which
provides that,
"No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech;
every person shall be free to say, write, or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse
of that liberty."'
The conclusion was reached that the purpose of the constitu.
tional provision was to abolish censorship and on this point the
court said,
"The authority to enjoin finds no better harbor in the
empty pocket of the poor man than in the full pocket of
the rich man. And such authority can have no existence
in circumstances such as the present case presents, if the
Constitution is to be obeyed. If these defendants are not
permitted to tell the story of their wrongs, or, if you
please their supposed wrongs, by word of mouth or with
pen or print, and to endeavor to persuade others to aid
them by all peaceable means in securing redress of such
wrongs, what becomes of free speech and what of personal
liberty? The fact that, in exercising that freedom they
"(1890) 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 45.
u (1902) 168 Mo. 133, 67 S.W. 391.
"2Mo. Co-snruno, Art. II, Sec. 14.
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thereby do plaintiff an actionable injury, such fact does
not go a hair towards a diminution of their right of free
speech, etc., for the exercise of which, if resulting in such
injury, the Constitution makes them expressly responsible.
But such responsibility is utterly incompatible with
authority in a court of equity to prevent such responsibility from occurring." (Emphasis supplied.)'a
The result reached here was unsuccessfully urged before the
Michigan court in connection with the Beck case a few years before with a nearly identical constitutional provision serving as
the basis of the argument. As noted above, the contention was
rejected by that tribunal which held that the picketing done in
connection with the boycott necessarily gave the circulars an improper coercive character, notwithstanding the merely persuasive
import of the words actually chosen by the union. It was apparently this concept of picketing which led to the difference in the
two cases since the Beck decision acknowledged that the workers
could have presented their case in newspapers or circulars with
no attempt at "coercion," i.e., picketing, peaceful or otherwise,
and such publication could not have been enjoined. Whether
the Missouri court would have decided the Marx case differently
had picketing been an element to consider is, of course, not
known. In view of language in the case, questioning whether
free speech could remain in a jurisdiction where workers are not
permitted "to persuade others to aid them by all peaceable
means," one might reasonably conclude that peaceful picketing
would have enjoyed the same immunity from injunction as was
extended to the publication of the circulars actually involved.
In any event, the steam was removed from the Marx case by a
later Missouri decision,1' dealing with the same problem, which
said the plaintiff employer went to court to complain against
the declaration of a secondary boycott, not the publication thereof, and it was remarked, apparently with a straight face, that
"If the boycott itself is enjoined, there would be no occasion for
complaint against its publication."
In 1908 the problem was presented to the Supreme Court
of Montana in Lindsay & Co., Ltd. v. Monta/na Federation of
5
Since the provisions of the Missouri and Montana ConLabor."
stitutions regarding free speech are very similar ' and the factual
"aMarx & Jean's Clothing Co. v. Watson supra note 11, at p. 395.
3
' MICH. CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 4.
"Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle (1908) 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997.
'6 (1908) 37 Mont. 264, 96 P. 127.
"No law shall be passed in" MONT. CONSTTUTION, Art. II, Sec. 10.
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situation facing the court was nearly identical with that offered
by the Marx case, it is not completely surprising to find the
courts reaching the same result. In the Lindsay case circulars
were printed and distributed describing the plaintiff as unfair
to organized labor, and requests were made to the public not to
trade with it "for your own protection and the protection of
organized labor."
An injunction forbidding such publication
was secured and an appeal therefrom was taken. After holding
the boycott to be legal, the court examined the means of effecting it, i.e., the circulars. In this connection, the free speech
argument was approved. After quoting the pertinent section
of the Montana Constitution 7 which provides for absolute freedom of speech and responsibility for abuse thereof, the court
said,
"It cannot be said that a citizen of Montana is free to
publish whatever he will on any subject while an injunction preventing him from publishing a particular item on
the subject hangs over him like the sword of Damocles,
ready to fall with all the power which can be invoked in
contempt proceedings, if he does the very thing the section
of the Constitution says he may do. It is impossible to
conceive the idea that the individual has an absolute right
to publish what he pleases, subject to the restriction mentioned, and at the same time entertain the idea that a
court may prevent him from doing so. The two ideas cannot possibly co-exist. The language of the section is not
susceptible of any other meaning than this: That the
individual citizen of Montana cannot be prevented from
speaking, writing, or publishing whatever he will on any
subject." (Emphasis supplied).
It was then announced that if the individual citizen could publish the circulars, the Montana Federation of Labor, an association of individuals, likewise had the right, and the injunction
was dissolved.
In Iverson v. Dilno a pure picketing problem was presented
to the Montana judges. Pickets, carrying a banner proclaiming
a Great Falls boarding house to be unfair to organized labor,
patrolled the walks in front of the premises. The court reaffirmed the doctrine of the Lindsay case "so far as applicable"
and refused to enjoin the publication of the criticisms displayed
pairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak,
write, or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible
for all abuse of that liberty; . .
note 16.
0(1911) 44 Mont. 270, 119 P. 719.

17Supra,
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on the banners. It was held, however, that blocking of public
streets could be an enjoinable nuisance and the case was sent
back for a hearing on that portion of the problem. The case
may be cited as authority for the proposition that peaceful
picketing is speech, but it seemingly limited the Lindsay decision by implying that a "threatening" publication could possibly
be restrained.
The next Montana case, pertinent to the subject, was Empire Theater v. Cloke."' It appeared that a union was displeased
with the employment of unorganized musicians by a Butte theater. To publicize this displeasure, the union stationed peaceful
pickets, bearing banners marked with appropriate messages,
along the approaches to the plaintiff's building. The Theater
Company sought the aid of the courts, claiming the picketing
activity was illegal, and thereby gave the occasion for the unqualified extension of the Lindsay doctrine to peaceful picketing.
The court answered contentions that the Lindsay doctrine
was bad law based on inadequate and repudiated decisions" by
saying, ". . . we. were and still are unable to conceive how anyone can possess the right to publish what he pleases subject only
to the penalty for abuse and at the same time be prevented by
any court from doing so." With this sentence, peaceful picketing clearly became recognized as a form of speech, on par with
the Lindsay circulars, entitled to protection of the supreme law
of Montana, and thereby gained security immeasurably greater
than that known before. Unlike their Missouri brethren, the
Montana judges met the issue squarely, and the straightforward
language of their spokesman, Mr. Justice Sanner, indicates that
they thought no other conclusion remotely possible in view of
the applicable law.
II.
Twenty-three years after the Cloke decision, the Federal
Supreme Court in deciding Thornhill v. Alabama! agreed with
Montana that peaceful picketing was an exercise of speech to
which constitutional safeguards should be applied and the new
"0(1917) 53 Mont. 183, 163 P. 107.
"Counsel for the plaintiff apparently believed his main hope lay in convincing the court that the Lindsay case was erroneously decided. No
great effort was made to distinguish the Lindsay circulars from the
picket-borne banners of the Cloke case, although some argument concerning nuisances took place. In other words, there is no suggestion
by counsel that because the pickets were involved, greater coercion was
in the air. The attitude seemed to be: If the Lindsay case is right,
then the plaintiff Is wrong.

"ISupra,note 1.
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security became nationwide. Whether or not the Montana holdings account in part for this present prominence of the doctrine
cannot be absolutely known. It is suggested, however, that there
is a strong possibility of an indirect, but no less real, connection
between the Cloke and Thornhill results. Such a statement is
prompted by the following speculations.
Justice Brandies' remarks in Senn v. Tile Layer's Protective
Union are said to be the first hint" that the Supreme Court
would seriously consider peaceful picketing as speech and are
acknowledged to have influenced the Thornhill result by the
court which decided that case.' In the Senn decision, which
held a Wisconsin law limiting the use of labor injunctions to be
constitutional, it was stated, "Clearly the means which the
statute authorizes-picketing and publicity-are not prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Members of a union might
without special statutory authorization by a State make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution." (Emphasis supplied). The emphasized portion of the quotation is the essence of what the Montana court said twenty years before with reference to peaceful
picketing and the Montana Constitution, ' and Justice Brandies
probably knew as much, since his 1923 dissent in Truax v. Corrigan" called attention to these decisions holding peaceful picketing to be legal. It is true that the Truax dissent did not mention
the constitutional basis of Montana's liberal views with regard
to the matter. Nevertheless, the fact that the cases were noted
insures Justice Brandies' complete familiarity therewith, for it
is unthinkable that such a judge would accept second-hand versions of the significance of particular decisions. It is therefore
-(1937) 301 U.S. 468.
2
1Supra, note 5.
2
1In the Thornhill decision, Justice Murphy explicitly quoted Brandies'
remarks concerning free speech and signified the court's agreement
therewith.
"That is, the Cloke case held peaceful picketing to be a form of speech
announcing labor troubles and as such, under constitutional protection.
It is true that Truax v. Bisbee (1918) 19 Ariz. 379, 170 P. 121 reached
a similar result but the court there relied very heavily on the Lindsay case and was obviously influenced by the Montana attitude while
the case of Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, Cooks and Waiters (1935) 2
Calif. (2nd) 312, 41 P. (2nd) 314, proceeded on the theory that peaceful picketing is speech, was decided 18 years after the Cloke case. Ex
parte Lyons (1938) 27 Calif. App. (2nd) 293, 81 P. (2nd) 190 based
on the Lisse case, explicitly held peaceful picketing to be free speech,
but there is no evidence that it became a particularly prominent decision, and the same may be said for Kirmse v. Adler (1933) 311 Pa. 78,
166 AtI. 566.
-(1921) 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375.
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ventured that the famous remarks in the Senn case did not result solely from their author's independent thinking on the subject but were, in part, products of his reflections on the Montana
cases he had encountered theretofore. If such be an accurate
surmise, the courts of Montana as well as Justice Brandies deserve some credit for the Thornhill doctrine. In any event, the
Cloke case stands as a contradiction of an intimation by one
writer that no impartial person took such free speech arguments
seriously before the Senn case."
III.
Though the broad holding of the Thornhill case has been
noted above, its exact scope as "explained" by later decisions
has not been discussed. It is proposed at this point to consider
limitations developed and their possible affect in Montana.
Picketing in the Thornhill case was of the "simple" variety,
since Thornhill was a striking employee picketing his employer's
plant with no third parties directly involved. The boycott was
a primary one, in other words. Although the language of the
decision seemed broad enough to extend constitutional sanction
beyond a pure employee-employer picketing situation, troublesome questions arose in this connection.
It is acknowledged that freedom of speech is subordinate to
a state's right to protect itself and is subject to reasonable regulation and restriction for the public welfare.' Some states have
considered secondary boycotts as incompatible with the public
good, and since the Thornhill decision, the Supreme Court has
had to concern itself with the reasonableness of such attitudes
because of their effect on peaceful picketing. Although many
believed the Thornhill doctrine was broad enough to safeguard
peaceful picketing when used to announce labor's grievances in
any case,' they were found to be erroneous for in Carpenter's
and Joiner's Union of America v. Ritter's CafeM the Supreme.
Court announced,
"It is true that by peaceful picketing workingmen communicate their grievances. As a means of communicating
the facts of a labor dispute peaceful picketing may be a
"GRmouy, at page 338 of his book "LABOR AND THE LAW," makes the
statement referred to. He was apparently unwilling to consider the
decisions of the Supreme Courts in Montana, Arizona, California, and
Pennsylvania as important. (See note 25, supra).
"'RoTTscHAEFER,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW,

p. 757.

"See Justice Reed's dissent in Carpenter's Union v. Ritter, infra, note 30.
T(

1 942 )

62 S.Ct. 807.

See also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,

(1949) 69 S.Ct. 684, 336 U.S. 490, 93 L.Ed. 649.
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phase of the constitutional right of free utterance. But
recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free
speech does not imply that states must be without power
to confine the sphere of communication directly related to
the dispute."
Thus the Supreme Court cleared the way for states to restrict
peaceful picketing when used in connection with secondary boycotts.
However, the rise and fall of the Thornhilt fortunes in this
respect should be a matter of complete indifference to the courts
of Montana when called upon to handle picketing cases. Peaceful pickets in this state were acknowledged to be exercising their
right of free speech long before Mr. Thornhill's troubles in Alabama and his rescue therefrom by the Supreme Court and can
continue to enjoy such status quite independently of the "new"
Federal doctrine. The Cloke decision specifically pointed out
that the free utterance provisions of the United States Constitution are not so broad as those appearing in its Montana counterpart and then concluded that federal decisions with regard to
the matter need not be considered controlling.' Although there
has been no indication that the Thornhill doctrine will be entirely consigned to history, if such does come to pass, the Cloke
decision should stand as firm as in the days before Alabama's
law collided with a court particularly conscious of civil rights.
It would not appear that attempts to break through peaceful
picketing's constitutional protection by attacking the boycott it
publishes would meet Montana approval. Counsel for the plaintiff in the Cloke case proceeded on such a theory arguing by the
Missouri formula as laid down in Fuelte v. Patent Door Co.,. ' to,
wit: "If this boycott itself is enjoined, there would be no occasion for . . . its publication." This contention met with little
success, the court answering, in effect, that boycotts, secondary
or otherwise, were legal under the common law of Montana. The
fact that the Ritter case suggests a somewhat different approach,
i.e., free speech is not absolute but is subordinate to an over3

a"We thought, as we still think that this second clause of our provision
conveys the idea of liberty, unchecked as to what may be published,
by anything save penalty and is therefore so material a departure
from the meaning given to the national provision that the federal cases
have little, if any significance." From Empire Theater v. Cloke, supra,
note 19. .

.

. The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution pro-

vides, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press." For the Montana free speech provision, see supra,
note 16.
3
2Supra, note 14.
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riding public policy, namely one against secondary boycotts,
gives no greater cause for concern since again it may be answered
that secondary boycotts are proper in Montana.
That is, the Cloke case, in re-emphasizing the rationale of
the Lindsay decision, stated that every person has a right to deal
or not to deal with whomever he pleases and that he may exercise such right singly or in combination with others. There are
no indications whatsoever in either the Cloke or Lindsay case
that this refusal to deal must be aimed at the employer who is
the primary target of union activity. On the contrary, the court
makes it abundantly clear in both decisions that a concerted refusal to deal with a neutral is as proper as such a refusal when
directed toward an actual disputant. Therefore, union men may
combine to boycott and may direct the power so generated at
anyone incurring their displeasure. Such conclusion needs no
greater support than the following declaration of Montana common law appearing in the Cloke, decision,
"... We come to the result common to both the Lindsay
and Dilno cases, which is to declare that labor unions are
not unlawful in this state; that such unions may publish
and pursue a peaceful boycott against any person or enterprise deemed by them unfriendly and that a combination for such purposes cannot be viewed as a conspiracy."
(Emphasis supplied).'a
Of course, a refusal to deal has little effect unless the person
boycotted knows where he stands with the union and why he is
in such position. In reality then, the heart of the secondary
boycott is a threat to neutrals which necessarily involves a publication. That is, the union announces to third persons through
pickets, circulars, etc. that it will boycott them unless they cease
to deal with the employer being pressured. In some jurisdictions, such as Texas where the Ritter case arose, this is said to
result in unjustifiable coercion. Montana disagrees, saying in
the Cloke case that the threat is primarily a publication of a
legitimate intention, and incidental coercion involved does not
deprive such publication of due constitutional protection.
In view of the above analysis, one may sum up the Montana
stand on secondary boycotts as follows: The common law of the
state permits concerted refusals to deal with any person regardless of such person's position in connection with the particular
labor dispute involved. The union may publish its intention to
'aEmpire Theater Co. v. Cloke (1917) 53 Mont. 183 at 192, 163 P. 107 at
109.
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cease dealing with the neutral, or the reasons for an accomplished
boycott against him, at any place where such announcement will
be effective, and the publication will be protected by the free
speech provisions of the state Constitution. In other words, the
concerted refusal to deal and the publication thereof are justified on separate grounds. The former is upheld under the common law while the latter is considered to be under constitutional
protection."
It is true that the Montana Legislature, in charting an area
for legitimate industrial strife, could change the common law by
branding a combination to cease dealing with neutrals as criminal conspiracy. But what of publication of a conspiracy so
condemned ? It would appear that peaceful picketing, even in
furtherance of the illegal boycott, would necessarily be immune
from injunction (the pickets might be subject to punishment
after the event) since the Lindsay and Cloke decisions announced in unmistakable terms that the publication of anything
could not be enjoined under the supreme law of the state. Put
another way, an injunction should not issue against peaceful
picketing in Montana regardless of where it is being carried on,"
even in cases where such activity would be inconsistent with an
anti-boycott statute.
Whether picketing with a "background of violence" could
be enjoined in Montana is another question. In Driver's Union
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, a U. S. Supreme Court case, undisciplined union men bombed dairies, beat up truck drivers and
generally conducted a terroristic campaign to organize plaintiff's
workers. Later, the union officially put out a picket line which
was peacefully conducted. At the dairy company's suit, an injunction against violence and picketing was granted. The union,
maintaining the trial court's order was too broad because it re"Although the facts In the Cloke case do not present a typical secondary
boycott situation since the pickets were operating around the place
of business of their primary opponent, the court indicated by its language that the idea of classifying boycotts according to their targets
would mean nothing In Montana. In the Lindsay case secondary boycotts were under way. The court assumed that the union had ceased
to deal with those found patronizing the wholesaler against whom the
organizing campaign was directed, and that notice of such fact was
implicit in the circulars involved.
TPicketing done In a manner constituting a nuisance under Iverson v.
Dilno, supra, note 18, would not be peaceful. Further, federal interference in the manner of Truax v. Corrigan, 8upra, note 26, presumably
Is no longer cause for concern, because Justice Brandies said in the
Senn case that such intervention is not justified In peaceful picketing
eases.
8(1941) 312 U.S. 287, 85 L.Ed. 837.
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strained peaceful picketing as well as violence, appealed to the
Supreme Court and pointed to the Thornhill case. It was held
that the violence which preceded the picketing gave the whole
"show" the effect of force and intimidation, and the injunction
was upheld.
It is suggested that the Meadowmoor route to restraint of
picketing should not be open in Montana. As noted above, the
Montana court, when deciding what is meant by free speech under its own Constitution, does not consider itself bound by decisions interpreting the narrower federal guaranty. Therefore, it
should solve a "background of violence" problem independently of the Meadowmoor case ....
It is re-emphasized that in the
Lindsay decision the court said, "the individual citizen of Montana cannot be prevented from speaking, writing, or publishing
whatever he will on any subject." Certainly such a pronouncement is broad enough to protect a publication from injunction
though it is likely to result directly in violence. In view of such
fact, a Montana court, agreeing with the Meadownoor case,
would leave the law in a rather anomalous state. That is, constitutional law, opposed to the restraint of any publication, although it be one naturally resulting in violence (i.e., criminally
or civilly libelous statements cannot be enjoined)' would at the
same time be willing to allow injunctions against publications
peaceful in themselves but "tainted" by past violence caused by
other forces.
It is conceded that even the "absolute" free speech provision of the Montana Constitution probably would not prevent a
court from restraining blasphemy or solicitation simply because
both are accomplished through publications.'
For example, it is
thought that the Montana tribunal could properly agree with
the U. S. Supreme Court's recent holding in Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co.' to the effect that picketing may not be used
to pressure another into the commission of a crime. Even in
these extreme cases, however, the unusual emphasis placed on
free speech by the framers of the Montana Constitution would
have to be recognized, and in view of the interpreting language
"The Lindsay case specifically points out that libelous publications cannot be enjoined.
8Attention has been called to limits imposed by nuisance statutes in
note 34 supra.
8(1949)
69 S.Ct. 684, 336 U.S. 490, 93 LEd. 649. Montana might consistently rule that picketing can be constitutionally maintained through
to represent that the picketers intend to do an unlawful act, on the
one hand, but that it cannot be continued to try to "coerce" a third
person to commit an unlawful act.
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in the Cloke and Lindsay cases, no great criticism could be justifiably directed at a decision holding such publication to be immune from injunctions.
IV.
To summarize, the following conclusions are repeated:
Peaceful picketing has been recognized as a form of speech entitled to the broad protection of Article II, Section 10 of the
Montana Constitution for over thirty years. The fact that such
picketing is done in connection with a secondary boycott is immaterial under present law. Even in cases where the picketing
is used to further an illegal purpose, it should be free from injunctions, with possible exceptions arising from situations where
the right is abused beyond all reason. These conclusions should
not be weakened by federal cases taking a narrower view of the
matter, due to differences between the pertinent provisions of
the two constitutions concerned. The Montana Court, unlike
some other tribunals, has refused to employ a double standard in
determining when free speech doctrines are to be applied. From
the beginning, it has been held that labor, as well as other segments of society, is entitled to free speech, and it is thought that
such fairness should prevail whenever the matter is tested in
this state.
DAVID WILLIAMS.

WRONGFUL DEATH OF MINOR-PROPER PARTY
PLAINTIFF
The Revised Code of Montana, 1947, Section 93-2809 (9075)
provides:
"A father, or in the case of his death or desertion of
his family, the mother, may maintain an action for the
injury or death or a minor child, and a guardian for injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death is
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another .. ."
We are here concerned with the ability of the mother to
bring suit under this section.
The Montana Supreme Court has indicated a necessity for
strict compliance with the terms of this statute in the parties it
qualifies as plaintiffs. Thus, the mother must affirmatively allege the death or desertion of the father or ". . the complaint
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